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INSURANCE
RICHARD H. LEE* AND EDWARD S. POLK**
This article focuses on recent legislative changes and judicial
interpretations in the area of automobile insurance. Amendments
to the Financial Responsibility Laws of Florida have, inter alia,
lowered the requisite amount of insurance coverage, shifted the
primary insurance burden from the automobile lessor to the les-
see's insurer, and disallowed joinder of the liability carrier as a
party to the litigation. Florida's no-fault statute has undergone
its most severe changes to date. The authors note that the
amendments are intended to limit victims' rights to recover dam-
ages from tortfeasors, the size of awards that victims may recover,
and the number of fraudulent claims. Uninsured motorist cover-
age has been limited by the elimination of stacking, but broad-
ened by including underinsured motorists within its provisions.
Attention is also given to developments in medical malpractice
insurance and the new statutory mandate for readable insurance
policies.
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Recent changes in insurance law in Florida have been so perva-
sive and of such magnitude that little is familiar. Yesterday's
heated disputes over the nature of equitable distribution,I and the
* Professor of Law, University of Miami.
** Research Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Tote, 325 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976); Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Avila, 317 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975); American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Oiler,
313 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975); Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fernandez, 307 So. 2d 906 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1975); Reyes v. Banks, 292 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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scope of Shingleton v. Bussey,2 have become academic exercises.
The source of most of this obsolescence has been the Florida legisla-
ture which in 1976 substantially amended the Financial Responsi-
bility Law I and the Automobile Reparations Reform Act.' In re-
sponse to legislative initiative and to modern common law concepts,
such as the doctrine of comparative negligence, the courts have also
made changes in insurance law.
I. AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE
A. Financial Responsibility Laws
Most forms of liability insurance protect the insured against the
risk of a legal obligation to pay damages to another upon the occur-
rence of a certain event.' Such protection is provided by automobile
policies,6 but in recent years the courts have determined that auto-
mobile liability insurance exists as much for the benefit and protec-
tion of the general public as for the insured.7 Legislatures have
responded with financial responsibility laws making minimum
amounts of such coverage compulsory for at least some drivers.
In 1973 the Florida Legislature increased the minimum limits
of liability from $10,000 for any individual in one accident and
$20,000 for two or more people in a single accident ($10,000/$20,000)
to $15,000/$30,000.1 In 1976, however, the legislature reverted to the
$10,000/$20,000 requirement.'" The reduction was undoubtedly in-
tended to encourage greater compliance with the law. Two circum-
2. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
3. FLA. STAT. ch. 324 (1975).
4. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-.741 (1975).
5. W. VANCE, LAW OF INSURANCE § 196 (3d ed. 1951).
6. The typical automobile insurance agreement provides that the company "will pay for
an insured all damages which the insured shall be legally obligated to pay because of: 'injury
arising out of the use of the automobile."' But the typical agreement also provides a "no
action" clause which requires full compliance by the insured with all of the terms of the policy
and which, in the event of noncompliance, gives the insurer a number of personal defenses
against the payment of the insured's legal obligations. See W. YOUNG, LAW OF INSURANCE,
Family Automobile Policy, App. 6 (1971).
7. See, e.g., Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966) (the prevalence of
insurance may remove the intra-family immunity to suit of a child when sued by its parent).
See also Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); W. YOUNG, supra note 6, at 574-
75.
8. See Laufer, Insurance Against Lack of Insurance?, 1969 DUKE L.J. 227.
9. 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-180, § 2 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 324.021(7) (1975)).
10. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-266, § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 324.021(7) (Supp. 1976)).
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stances make questionable whether the lower financial responsibil-
ity requirements will have the desired effect: (1) liability rates are
not proportioned exactly to the limits of coverage, so that the lower
required limits will not result in proportionately lower automobile
insurance rates, and (2) for many Florida drivers most or all of the
reduction effected by lowering coverages was absorbed by a rate
increase which took effect on the same day as the new act." Thus,
it appears that the ultimate cost of insurance has not been reduced
appreciably.
Another change in the Financial Responsibility Law was to
increase from $200 to $500 the amount of property damage which
would bring into play the provisions of the Financial Responsibility
Law for loss of license and registration unless there was liability
insurance or a settlement with the injured party.'2 This change ap-
pears to recognize the impact of inflation on automobile repair costs
and attempts to limit the scope of the statute to matters of sub-
stance.
It remains to be seen whether the benefit to the driver of lower
mandatory limits of coverage will be coupled with stricter enforce-
ment of the financial responsibility laws. The Financial Responsi-
bility Law in Florida is a "one-bite statute," requiring proof of re-
sponsibility only after an accident had occurred.' 3 Although the
Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act (No-fault) makes it
mandatory for all registered vehicles to comply with the minimum
limits of liability coverage set forth in the Financial Responsibility
Law or provide other satisfactory security," there is at present no
viable means of compelling performance until an accident occurs."
Thus, Florida remains for all practical purposes a "one-bite" state,
and experience indicates that substantial numbers of vehicles on
Florida highways are without liability insurance."
B. Leased Vehicles
Traditionally the insurer of a vehicle bears the primary respon-
sibility for injury caused by third parties using the vehicle with the
11. Miami Herald, Sept. 30, 1976, § A, at 1, col. 5.
12. FLA. STAT. § 324.051(2)(a) (Supp. 1976).
13. FLA. STAT. § 324.051(2)(a) (1975).
14. FLA. STAT. § 627.733(1) (1975).
15. See [19721 FLA. Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 264.
16. Miami Herald, Dec. 29, 1976, § A, at 6, col. 1.
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insured's consent. In such a case the owner's policy affords primary
coverage,'7 or as is commonly said, "insurance follows the vehicle."
Policies usually provide that the drive-other-cars coverage for the
normal insured is excess'8 and a third-party driver is covered pri-
marily under the omnibus clause of the owner's policy. Where a
claim involving a third-party driver is made most insurers support
these provisions. They feel that the certainty of the rule outweighs
the temporary advantages which might be obtained by a "battle of
forms." All insurers do not take this position. Insurers of leased
vehicles, in particular, have tried to shift the primary coverage to
the lessee-driver's insurer.
Until July 1, 1976, the efforts of the lessor's insurers to shift
their burden to the lessee's insurer met with no success. However,
the enactment of section 627.7263 of the Florida Statutes, effective
July 1, 1976,20 specifically provides that with regard to rental cars
the driver's insurance shall be primary. Regardless of the language
of the driver's policy the statutory language will control. The change
17. The 1955 Standard Family Automobile Liability Policy defines an insured as:
Ill. Definition of Insured (a) With respect to the insurance for bodily injury
liability and for property damage liability the unqualified word insured includes
the named insured and, if the named 'isured' is an individual, his spouse if a
resident of the same household, and also includes any person or organization
legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile
is by the named insured or such spouse or with the permission of either.
RiSJORD &-AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES-STANDARD PROVISIONS AND APPENDIX
18-19 (1964); reprinted in R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW 77 n.12 (1971). Florida Statutes section
324.151 (1975) requires that in order for a motor vehicle liability policy to be proof of financial
responsibility it "shall insure the owner named therein and any other person as operator using
such motor vehicle . . . with the express or implied permission of such owner .... "
18. "[Tlhe insurance with respect to a temporary substitute automobile or a non-owned
automobile shall be excess insurance over any other collectible insurance." Family Automo-
bile Policy, App. 6, W. YOUNG, supra note 6, at 693; see Aaacon Auto Transp. Inc. v. Demshar,
312 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
19. E.g., Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Jackson, 330 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976). The court
in Jackson relied upon the decision in Roth v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1972),
and held that the lessor's insurer could not limit the coverage of its omnibus provision because
this would be inconsistent with the public policy of the Financial Responsibility Law requir-
ing omnibus protection. See note 17 supra. The court also stated that no right of indemnifica-
tion existed on the part of the lessor or his insurer against the lessee-tortfeasor.
The decision denying limitation of the omnibus provision was correct. An omnibus in-
surer should not recover from its own insured for the very loss it insured him against. The
statement that no right of indemnification exists between the lessor-owner and the lessee-
tortfeasor, however, was dictum, and does not seem to be supportable. It is one thing to deny
an insurer indemnification from its insured; it is another to deny a passive tortfeasor recovery
from the active wrongdoer in the absence of insurance.
20. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-56 § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.7263 (Supp. 1976)).
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will no doubt be pleasing to automobile rental companies. It will be
interesting to see if their charges for "insurance" will be affected.
The problem of priority between insurers should not be con-
fused with the underlying question of liability between the owner
and the driver. The driver presumably is liable because of his
negligence. The owner will be liable either on a theory of respondeat
superior or upon Florida's unique "dangerous instrumentality doc-
trine.""1 As far as the injured third party is concerned, both the
owner and driver are primarily liable. As between the owner and the
driver, presumably, their liability will depend upon the application
of rules of indemnification and contribution.
C. Nonjoinder of Insurance Company in Litigation
In 1969 Florida became the first state to adopt direct action by
judicial fiat, when the supreme court decided Shingleton v.
Bussey. 22 This decision permitted liability insurers to be included as
defendants in lawsuits arising out of the negligent acts of their in-
sureds. The Shingleton rule as it applied to automobile liability
insurers was changed by the legislature in 1976.23 In cases arising out
of accidents occurring on or after October 1, 1976, the liability car-
rier may not be joined as a party to the action until after the trial,
unless it intends to assert a policy or coverage defense. Notwith-
standing this change, final judgment may include an award against
the insurance company, even though it was not previously a defen-
dant. There is no express prohibition against mentioning the fact of
insurance; therefore, it is possible the courts may be unable to pre-
vent a statement to the jury regarding the existence of coverage. It
is also likely that juries are sufficiently aware of automobile insur-
ance to assume that when suit is brought against the tortfeasor, and
not as an uninsured motorist claim, the defendant is probably cov-
ered by insurance. If the legislative purpose in enacting this nonjoin-
der section was to diminish the use of the "deep-pocket theory" in
determining jury awards, then it may only achieve limited success.
A possible constitutional question might be posed by the new
statute based upon a suggestion in the Shingleton case that the right
21. See Ford, Torts, Survey of Fla. Law, 18 U. MIAMI L. REv. 854-57 (1964); Note, The
Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine: Unique Automobile Law in Florida, 5 U. FLA. L. REv.
412 (1952).
22. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
23. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (Supp. 1976) (added by 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-266, § 12).
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to join an insurer in litigation is required by due process. Prior to
Shingleton, a plaintiff would have to first recover a judgment
against the tortfeasor, then file another action against the insurance
company in order to enforce the judgment.24 The Shingleton court
found fault with this procedure:
The unfettered right of a plaintiff to sue defendants jointly is so
universal and essential to due process that it can rarely be cur-
tailed or restricted by private contract between potential defen-
dants.
It is an anomaly in the law and discriminatory for the
parties to a contract to attempt to deny non-consenting members
of the public a full, complete, adequate remedy at law which is
constitutionally guaranteed all citizens.25
The fact that such procedures are now dictated by statute rather
than by the "no action" clause 6 of a policy does not alter the effect
on the plaintiff who is a third party. If it were violative of due
process for the insurer and insured to contract for such a provision,
it should not be less so because the legislature has required it.
D. Judicial Interpretation
Much judicial energy has been expended over the past few years
on matters that are now moot. The scope of Shingleton and the
meaning of equitable distribution took up considerable space in case
reports.27 But the most serious issue recently resolved by the Su-
preme Court of Florida involved the impact of the comparative
negligence rule on the liability of insurers. The question first raised
in Stuyvesant Insurance Co. v. Bournazian,5 was: Where compara-
tive negligence requires mutual setoffs, must the respective insurers
of the litigating parties pay the full claim against their insureds, or
24. E.g., Artille v. Davidson, 126 Fla. 219, 170 So. 707 (1936), overruled by Shingleton
v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
25. 223 So. 2d at 717-18.
26. No action shall lie against Allstate until after full compliance with all the
terms of this policy nor, as respects insurance afforded under Section 1, (liability),
until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally deter-
mined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by written
agreement of the insured, the claimant and Allstate.
Family Automobile Policy, App. 6, W. YOUNG, supra note 6, at 702.
27. See note 1 supra.
28. No. 46,573 (Sup. Ct. Fla. filed Mar. 10, 1976) (opinion on rehearing Dec. 16, 1976).
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should they receive the benefit of the setoffs? The supreme court in
Bournazian at first allowed the insurer the benefit of the setoff; but
on reconsideration the court held that the setoff applied only be-
tween the uninsured parties to a negligence action and in no way
affected the contractual liability of the paid insurers.
There has been the usual volume of opinions interpreting insur-
ance policies. The phrase "arising out of the use of the insured
vehicle" was interpreted to cover death to a person struck by a beer
can thrown from a fast-moving automobile, 29 but not to cover injury
to a child who walked into a protruding bolt on a parked car."0 The
phrase was also interpreted to exclude the death of an insured's son
who was killed while removing a pistol from beneath the seat of his
father's car.' The term "accident" under the medical payments
coverage of an automobile liability policy was held to include a
cerebral vascular accident, or broken blood vessel in the brain, the
cause of which was unknown. 2 The fact that the "accident" oc-
curred while the insured stooped to examine a gas stove in his travel
trailer was sufficient to bring the event within the coverage of the
automobile medical payments coverage.
An automobile liability policy is no longer regarded primarily
as a means of idemnifying the insured, but rather as a means of
protecting the public. This shift in emphasis has caused much of the
inefficiency presently attributed to the fault concept in automobile
tort law. Mandatory liability coverage is obviously intended to pro-
tect the public. Decisions such as Shingleton,13 which permit the
carrier to be joined in an action against the insured, may even be
construed to suggest an independent liability resting on the insur-
ance company. Subsequent decisions, however, have considerably
weakened this suggestion." As an example, Ramos v. Northwestern
Mutual Insurance Co.35 is in direct conflict with the imposition of
independent liability upon the insurer. In that case the court, con-
trary to recent trends elsewhere, refused to hold an automobile lia-
bility insurer liable where the insured's failure to cooperate substan-
29. Valdes v. Smalley, 303 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
30. O'Dwyer v. Manchester Ins. Co., 303 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
31. Watson v. Watson, 326 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
32. Roberson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 330 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
33. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
34. See Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970).
35. 325 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975), aff'd, No. 48-510 (Sup. Ct. Fla. filed May 26, 1976),
rehearing denied, No. 48-510 (Sup. Ct. Fla. filed May 26, 1976).
19771
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tially prejudiced the insurer.
If the need is to protect the public from the financial effects of
the inevitable accidents resulting from the use of an automobile, a
more efficient means must be found. The concept of no-fault repre-
sents a valid effort in the search. Unfortunately, no-fault and the
traditional tort system do not seem to work well together. Vested
interests do not willingly retire. There are no easy answers, but
unless the costs, both financial and social, of our motorized society
can be brought within controllable limits, the likelihood of federal
intervention, of total no-fault, of severe limits on recovery for pain
and suffering, and of a shift from a judicial to an administrative
system of control appear inevitable.
I. NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
In 1971, the Florida legislature in the Florida Automobile
Reparations Reform Act adopted the concept of no-fault automobile
insurance, effective January 1, 1972.36 The stated purposes were
twofold:
[T]o require medical, surgical, funeral and disability insurance
benefits to be provided without regard to fault under motor vehi-
cle policies that provide bodily injury and property damage lia-
bility insurance, or other security, for motor vehicles registered
in this state and, with respect to motor vehicle accidents, a limi-
tation on the right to claim damages for pain, suffering, mental
anguish and inconvenience."
In addition, a third goal of reducing insurance premiums was re-
flected in the statute's initial requirement that rates for required
financial responsibility coverages be reduced by not less than fifteen
percent on the effective date of the Act.3" Since its original enact-
ment, the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act has been
altered, amended, and overhauled several times, most recently and
most drastically in 1976. The courts, of course, have made their
contributions to the process, deciding constitutional challenges to
various portions of the Act39 as well as rendering interpretations of
36. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-252 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-.741 (1975)).
37. FiA. STAT. § 627.731 (1975).
38. FLA. STAT. § 627.741(2) (1971) (repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-266, § 13).
39. See Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974) (holding FLA. STAT. §
627.737 (1973) unconstitutional in part); Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973) (holding




The 1976 amendments attempt to accomplish three things: (1)
limit further the acciden victim's right to recover damages from his
tortfeasor; ° (2) limit the amount actually recovered by those acci-
dent victims who are able to maintain claims against their tortfea-
sors, 41 and (3) reduce the incidence of fraud in accident claims.2
A. Tortfeasor's Immunity
Tortfeasors who have complied with the law by maintaining
minimum liability coverages are granted immunity from claims by
an injured party except where a certain threshold is passed.4 Under
the original Act there were eight such thresholds: (1) medical expen-
ses in excess of $1,000; (2) permanent disfigurement; (3) a fracture
of a weight-bearing bone; (4) a compound, comminuted, displaced,
or compressed fracture; (5) loss of a body member; (6) permanent
injury within reasonable medical probability; (7) permanent loss of
a bodily function; or (8) death.4 4 Until the 1976 revision of the Act
there was no major legislative alteration of this scheme. However,
the right to maintain an action on the basis of a fracture of a weight-
bearing bone was held unconstitutional as a denial of equal protec-
tion.
45
The 1976 revision replaced the earlier thresholds with the fol-
lowing: (1) loss of a body member; (2) permanent loss of a bodily
function; (3) permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medi-
cal probability; (4) significant permanent scarring or disfigurement;
(5) serious nonpermanent injury which has a material degree of
bearing on the individual's ability to resume his normal life-style
during substantially all of the 90 day period following the injury,
and the effects of which are medically or scientifically demonstrable
at the end of such period; or (6) death.4 It is not immediately clear
whether the new criteria resolve more uncertainty than they create.
It is suggested that this revision is so ambiguous that the bar can
40. See FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2), (3) (Supp. 1976). This school codifies in the damage
limitation requirements.
the insurer's right to equitable distribution and the collateral source rule.
42. See FLA. STAT. §§ 627.7375, 626.989 (Supp. 1976). These sections were created specifi-
cally to deal with fraudulent insurance claims.
43. FLA. STAT. § 627.737(1) (Supp. 1976).
44. FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2) (1973).
45. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
46. FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2), (3) (Supp. 1976).
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reasonably expect contradictory judicial determinations. Further-
more, certain criteria could again be the subject of constitutional
attacks.
Conspicuously absent from the list of tort thresholds is the one
most frequently employed in the past-medical expenses exceeding
$1,000 in value. Without such a provision the Act may be unconsti-
tutional. As an example, those plaintiffs whose only avenue for mak-
ing a claim would be based on medical expenses greater than $1000
could possibly challenge the 1976 revision by analogizing to the
decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in Kluger v. White.47 In
Kluger the court held Florida Statute section 627.738 unconstitu-
tional because it denied the right of access to the courts guaranteed
by the Florida Constitution.48 Section 627.738 precluded tort claims
for property damage not exceeding $550. The court held that a rem-
edy cannot be abolished by the legislature without providing a rea-
sonable alternative, unless there is an overpowering public necessity
and no alternative method of meeting that public necessity can be
shown. Using this rationale, removal of $1000 in medical expenses
as a threshold could possibly be viewed as abolition of a remedy.
The new statute thus appears especially vulnerable where the
individual has exhausted his first party benefits with no additional
recourse, while other victims have additional alternatives under
other thresholds. Assume, for example, that an accident victim sus-
tains nonpermanent injuries which incapacitate him for less than
ninety days. Should the total of his medical expenses, out-of-pocket
expenses and lost income exceed $5,000, he will have exhausted his
Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits 41 without acquiring the
right to recover his excess damages from any source whatsoever.
The subsection of the Act relating to "serious non-permanent
injury which has a material degree of bearing on the injured person's
ability to resume his normal activity and life-style during all or
substantially all of the ninety day period after the occurrence of the
injury," 50 is a new threshold. It is probably the single most confusing
section of the statute because of the subjective nature of its terms.
The section's language offers no guidance in determining when this
particular threshold has been passed. The words, "serious," "mate-
47. 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
48. FLA. CONST. art., 1 § 21.
49. FLA. STAT. § 627.736 (Supp. 1976).
50. FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2)(e) (Supp. 1976).
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rial," "normal activity," and "medically or scientifically demonstr-
able" converge in one paragraph to create a standard with virtually
no predictable parameters. Moreover, this subsection creates an
additional problem of proof for the plaintiff. In addition to proving
liability on the part of the defendant and the damages sustained,
plaintiffs may now be required to establish their normal activities
and life-styles prior to and immediately after the accident. As a
result, courts may expend substantial time hearing evidence on
plaintiffs life-style. Although the statute makes such evidence ma-
terial, it may prevent the court from focusing on those facts giving
rise to the cause of action.
The subsection of the Act pertaining to "significant permanent
scarring or disfigurement,"'" leaves the definition of its operative
terms to judicial interpretation. It is not clear what standard will
be used to measure significance-visibility to others, size of the scar,
location on the body, impairment of one's personal beauty, or some
other criteria.
B. Subrogation, Equitable Distribution and Collateral Sources
Another of the major changes brought about by the 1976 Act
concerns the right of the first party insurer to recover sums paid out
by it on behalf of an injured who recovers a tort settlement or judg-
ment. Personal Injury Protection (PIP) carriers were previously pro-
tected by the doctrine of equitable distribution.5" The PIP carrier
would be reimbursed from the amount recovered from the tortfeasor
for a portion of the benefits it had initially paid out. Rarely, how-
ever, would a PIP carrier recover all or even a substantial part of
its expenditure.53 Thus, the insured was able to apply a portion of
his no-fault benefits toward offsetting the costs of the tort action.
Section 727.736(3) was rewritten in 1976 to do away with all
right of recovery by the PIP carrrier.54 Under the new Act the PIP
carrier may not recover any of the sums it has paid out, but the
plaintiff is also precluded from recovering such amounts from the
tortfeasor. Thus, the victim's personal injury protection enures to
the benefit of the wrongdoer's insurer. This proposition is shocking
at first, but becomes more palatable when it is realized that in the
51. FLA. STAT § 627.737(2)(d) (Supp. 1976).
52. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(3) (1975) (amended Supp. 1976).
53. See cases cited supra note 1.
54. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(3) (Supp. 1976).
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long run the benefits will be shared by all carriers, and could result
in considerably less litigation. In addition, it should be noted that
the traditional collateral source rule, whereby the tortfeasor is not
allowed credit for any available sources which reduce the victim's
net damage, -has been eliminated. As a result the loss will be borne
by the no-fault carrier up to the no-fault limits. Therefore, litigation
of claims within those limits could be considerably reduced. As an
example, where the PIP carrier pays benefits in the amount of
$3,000, and the parties agree that the claim is worth $10,000 (or if a
jury reaches that verdict), the defendant's company will only pay
$7,000, while the no-fault carrier will pay $3,000. The plaintiff will
be fully compensated from the two sources and will not be required
to reimburse his PIP carrier through equitable distribution.
One undesired effect of this new procedure may be to increase
settlement demands by plaintiffs in order to absorb the collateral
source and still produce a sufficient fund to pay their attorneys.
This result could either increase the amount paid per claim or, by
decreasing the likelihood of settlements, increase the number of
lawsuits. Neither consequence is desirable. Another possible result
is that premiums for the PIP portion of the policy will be increased,
since there is no subrogation or other means of recovering benefits
paid out. However, it is generally recognized that subrogation recov-
eries are windfalls and play no part in rate making.
Finally, it is not clear how this new provision will apply to
individuals who either are covered under a PIP deductible, pursuant
to section 627.739,11 or are not protected by no-fault insurance. Sec-
tion 627.736(3) provides that "an injured party or his legal repre-
sentative . . . shall have no right to recover any damages for which
personal injury protection benefits are paid or payable. "I' It is not
clear whether "paid or payable" refers to those items collectible
under a policy or simply any amount which is eligible for PIP bene-
fits under the statute. If the latter, then one who elects a PIP de-
ductible cannot be compensated for this amount because he waived
the insurer's liability for the amount of the deductible and section
627.736(3) precludes any right of recovery. Thus, the victim be-
comes a collateral source whose protection enures to the tortfeasor's
benefit. A far more equitable interpretation of section 627.736(3)
55. The insured may elect personal injury protection deductibles in varying amounts, the
maximum being $2,000. FLA. STAT. § 627.739 (Supp. 1976).
56. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(3) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
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would be that "payable" applies only to those benefits actually
collectible under the terms of an existing policy. This interpretation
would enable the insured to recover the amount of the deductible
from the tortfeasor.
C. Fraud
Reacting to the public outcry over skyrocketing premiums and
publicity imputing this to fraudulent claims, the 1976 legislature
created a Division of Fraudulent Claims57 within the Department of
Insurance and established authority and procedures for it.5 Upon
request by an automobile insurance company, the Division is to
investigate the facts surrounding a claim and report any violations
found by it to the proper state's attorney or licensing agency. The
measure is designed to help remedy one of the evils of the tort
system, the collusive or otherwise dishonest claim for damage re-
sulting from non-existent or exaggerated injuries. It is conceded that
strong measures are necessary to deal with these problems, but the
stronger the measure, the greater the potential for abuse.
The dangers inherent in the system designed by the legislature
are evidenced by the provision relieving informants from liability.
The Act provides that neither the informing insurance company nor
its agents or employees shall be subject to libel or other civil liability
by virtue of providing the Division of Fraudulent Claims with a
report of alleged fraud or any other requested information.59 This
absolute privilege is deemed necessary to protect informers from
suits filed by those informed upon. In view of the nature of the
offense, the likelihood of litigation would be great were the privilege
not absolute. However, there is no requirement that the informer
shall have acted in good faith. It is always possible that an insurer
could use the law to harass an aggressive and zealous plaintiff's
attorney. In such a situation an attorney would have no way to
protect himself. An even greater risk lies in the fact that neither the
report nor the subsequent investigation are confidential. The poten-
tial for abuse is obvious. Unsubstantiated charges could destroy
reputations without an appropriate forum for vindication. There-
57. FLA. STAT. § 20.13(7) (Supp. 1976).
58. FLA. STAT. § 626.989 (Supp. 1976). There are also provisions for criminal liability.
See FLA. STAT. § 627.7375 (Supp. 1976).
59. FLA. STAT. § 626.989(3) (Supp. 1976).
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fore, the implementation of this new Act will require the restraint
and sound discretion of the Division of Fraudulent Claims as well
as the insurance industry.
III. UNINSURED MOTORIST CONVERAGES
In recent years one of the most active areas of insurance law in
Florida has been protection against uninsured motorists.6 This pro-
tection enables an insured to be recompensed from his own carrier,
up to the limits of his uninsured motorist coverage, as if the unin-
sured motorist had purchased automobile liability insurance in
compliance with the Financial Responsibility Law. By its terms the
statute recognizing uninsured motorist coverages provides that au-
tomobile liability insurance issued within the state must contain
uninsured motorist coverage, unless rejected by "any insured
named in the policy."' The statute further directs that the coverage
shall be excess over any benefits available under workmen's com-
pensation or other disability benefits law. 2
A. Waiver
The right of an insured to waive the coverage has been thor-
oughly litigated in recent years. The District Court of Appeal of
Florida, First District, has stated that because the coverage is re-
quired by statute and must be affirmatively rejected, the waiver
must be knowingly made." Thus, where the insured waives coverage
on the advice of an agent, because of a mistaken belief that it would
be coextensive with the free medical care received as a military
family, the waiver may not have been knowingly made.
The rejection must be knowingly made by an "insured named
in the policy."'" The latter phrase has been narrowly construed twice
by the Third District, in substantially identical cases, Protective
National Insurance Co. v. McCall5 and Weathers v. Mission Insur-
ance Co."6 In both cases the husband was the named insured but the
60. 1961 Fla. Laws ch. 61-175 added the first uninsured vehicle provision (originally
codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.0851 (1961) and now at FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (1975)).
61. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(1) (1975).
62. Id.
63. Wilson v. National Indem. Co, 302 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
64. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(1) (1975).
65. 310 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
66. 258 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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wife purchased the policy. It was not discovered that the wife had
executed the waiver until after the claim arose. In each case the
court held the waiver to be invalid because the husband was the
named insured, and the wife was not qualified to reject the coverage.
The McCall court's position was not altered by the fact that the
claim was submitted by Mrs. McCall, the signer of the waiver, for
her own injuries."
Similarly, the courts will not enforce a rejection executed after
the accident. In Manchester Insurance & Indemnification Co. v.
Jones," the insured was visited in the hospital by his agent, eight
days after the accident. The court disallowed the company's argu-
ment that the waiver should relate back to the date of the applica-
tion for insurance.
B. Stacking by Individuals
Among the major changes brought about by the legislation in
the 1976 version of the no-fault law is the provision that uninsured
motorist benefits are limited by the coverage on the vehicle actually
involved in the accident. Where the accident is sustained in a differ-
ent vehicle, benefits are limited by the coverage of any one of the
insured vehicles." This new section rejects the judicial viewpoint
which allowed individual insureds to aggregate or "stack" the cover-
ages from separate vehicles. 0 Prior to the new statutory provision,
if one carried uninsured motorist protection of $10,000/$20,000 on
each of three vehicles, he would be entitled to stack the coverages,
effectively giving him a policy of $30,000/$60,000.11 Under the 1976
Act he would be limited to the $10,000/$20,000 limit on any one of
his vehicles.
The judicial rationale favoring stacking of coverages had been
first enunciated by the First District in Travelers Indemnity Co. v.
Powell," where a husband and wife were allowed to stack the cover-
ages they had obtained under separate policies. Another case de-
67. 310 So. 2d at 325, 326.
68. 317 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
69. FLA. STAT. § 627.4132 (Supp. 1976).
70. See generally Tucker v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 288 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1973);
Sellers v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 214 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968), cert.
dismissed, 229 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1969).
71. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v, Anderson, 332 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
72. 206 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
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cided by the First District the same year extended the reasoning one
step further. If a husband and wife may stack coverages obtained
through separate policies, then they should be able to stack where
the vehicles are listed on the same policy. As the court noted in
Sellers v. Government Employees Insurance Co.," this is especially
persuasive when a separate premium is paid for uninsured motorist
coverage on each automobile. Sellers was reaffirmed in the case of
Tucker v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 4 in which the
court held that where a separate premium was charged and paid for
each vehicle in a combination policy, the limits could be stacked.
By the time the 1976 legislature convened, the status of the
uninsured motorist provisions of a policy was clear. The courts saw
section 627.72711 as defining public policy in favor of each individual
being given a source of recovery for damages incurred by the negli-
gence of uninsured drivers.7 As such, the right to the benefits would
not be denied lightly, and the extent of coverage would be as broad
as possible. Indeed, the courts appeared willing to find for the in-
sured whenever possible. The legislature, however, in setting out to
deal with the ever-increasing cost of automobile insurance rejected
this judicial policy by eliminating stacking.
Notwithstanding this change the legislature increased the
amount of uninsured motorist coverage which must be made avail-
able for purchase by the insured. Previously the coverage was to be
offered in an amount equal to the limit of liability coverage written
into the policy." The new statute provides that the insurer shall
make available limits as high as $100,000/$300,000, regardless of the
amount of liability coverage. This latter provision preserves the
basic advantage of stacking; higher limits of coverage may still be
obtained if one is willing to pay for them.
73. 214 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968), cert. dismissed, 229 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1969).
74. 288 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1973).
75. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(1) (1975).
76. See, e.g., Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1971). In
Mullis, the supreme court accepted the principle that uninsured motorist coverage on one
vehicle could protect the insured while operating a different vehicle. A named insured operat-
ing an uninsured vehicle and injured by an uninsured motorist was held to be covered by his
uninsured motorist policy. A provision excluding from the policy injuries sustained in vehicles
not covered by the policy was found to be ineffective on the ground that the legislature
intended to afford protection from uninsured motorists.
77. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(1) (1975).




Another facet of the stacking question has been the applicabil-
ity of the doctrine to commercial policies, that is, may the coverages
from multiple vehicles owned by a corporation be stacked? Propo-
nents of the concept might argue that the broad language and un-
derlying reasoning of the Sellers and Tucker line of cases should
extend the doctrine to the commercial area. The Third District has
held otherwise,7" however, relying on the 1972 decision of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia in Cunningham v. Insurance Co. of North
America.80
The Virginia case established two classes of insureds, a class of
named insureds consisting of those who pay the multiple premiums,
and a separate class of omnibus insureds, whose only claim under
the policy is that they were occupants of the vehicle at the time of
the accident. The first class is entitled to stack the coverages on the
basis of the company's contractual commitment, since multiple
premiums have been paid by the claimant. The second class of
insureds, however, may not stack because there is no contractual
relation between the carrier and such insureds."s The court ex-
pressed some concern that the omnibus insured in that case was
asking to stack coverages on 4,368 vehicles. This would provide to
each individual a maximum liability coverage amounting to
$65,520,000. The total exposure per accident would result in a vir-
tually bottomless supply of exposure for the carrier.
Doubtless, the result in Cunningham was compelled by the
thought of an insurance carrier being saddled with outrageous expo-
sure on large fleet policies. However, does the small "fleet," which
frequently may be part of a family business, present a different
issue? This situation was faced by the Third District in Marks v.
Travelers Indemnity Co. 2 and by the Supreme Court of Alabama
in General Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gilmore.83 In each case the
applicable policy covered seven vehicles. The district court in
Marks, following Cunningham, denied any right to stack where the
claimant's status as an insured was based entirely on his occupancy
of the vehicle. The Alabama Supreme Court, however, reached the
79. Marks v. Travelers Indem. Co., 339 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
80. 213 Va. 72, 189 S.E.2d 832 (1972).
81. 213 Va. at 74-78, 189 S.E.2d at 834-36.
82. 339 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
83. 294 Ala. 546, 319 So. 2d 675 (1975).
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opposite result by creating a category limited to the regular users
of a particular vehicle. The court reasoned that the regularly as-
signed driver of a vehicle is the individual most likely to be in need
of the policy benefits. As a result, the court concluded that the
driver becomes a third party beneficiary to the contract, entitled to
all its benefits. This apparently strained holding in Gilmore was
substantially diluted by the same court six months later in Lambert
v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.84 There, the facts were closer to
Cunningham than they were to either Marks or Gilmore in that a
fleet of 1,699 vehicles were insured under one policy. The Alabama
court followed the Virginia case thereby leaving Gilmore alone in its
permissive treatment of stacking by occupants of a commercial ve-
hicle.
The majority rule appears to be that which was expressed by
the Supreme Court of Virginia. Gilmore, which represents a minor-
ity view, may break down when applied to a policy that covers more
than a small number of vehicles. In the case of a small commercial
fleet there may be relief for drivers of cars owned by a small or
family business if the courts are willing to limit the number of
vehicles whose coverages may be stacked. Thus far, the courts in
Florida and elsewhere have been unwilling to attempt such a demar-
cation, preferring to use a uniform rule. This uniformity appears a
more logical and equitable course. At any rate, the problem is of
limited duration in Florida since stacking is not permitted for acci-
dents occurring after October 1, 1976.85
D. Underinsured Motorists
Occasionally, a policyholder suffers severe injuries in an acci-
dent caused by a negligent driver who only has the bare minimum
of liability coverage. In such cases the liability limits of the tortfea-
sor's policy may be wholly inadequate to compensate the victim for
his damages. Prior to 1973 the term "uninsured motorist" in the
Florida Statute86 included one whose policy was issued by a liability
insurer unable to pay because of insolvency. It did not include any
provision for drivers whose limits of coverage were inadequate to
meet the circumstances. Where victims sought to establish such a
84. 331 So. 2d 260 (1976).
85. FLA. STAT. § 627.4132 (Supp. 1976).
86. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(2) (1973).
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right, the courts adamantly rejected the argument.87 These decisions
were based on a literal reading of the statute and the definition of
an uninsured motorist. In 1973 the statute was amended, and unin-
sured motorist coverage was expressly extended to cover the under-
insured motorist.8 The courts have been just as consistent in allow-
ing underinsured motorist claims under the 1973 statute as they
were in rejecting such coverage previously. 9 Underinsured motorist
coverage may be stacked in the same manner as uninsured motorist
coverage °
IV. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
The 1976 1egiglature continued to struggle with the problems
caused by skyrocketing costs of medical malpractice insurance. In
addition to the medical liability mediation panels previously cre-
ated," emphasis was placed upon a Medical Incident Committee."
One committee is to be established by each "health care facility"
in the state and is to investigate any injury or adverse incident to a
patient which is brought to its attention. The committee may award
compensation to the injured person if it determines that a compens-
able injury has occurred. 3 Accepting such an award will not prohibit
the patient from bringing suit in the courts, but the compensation
awarded him and the value of any rehabilitative services given him
will be deducted from any damages he may eventually receive. 4 The
abolition of the collateral source rule will also reduce his recovery. 5
Moreover, no claimant is to be awarded general damages exceeding
$250,000.6
87. American Fire and Cas. Co. v. Dawson, 320 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975); Summers
v. Jackson, 307 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975); Lange v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
300 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clay, 299 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1974); Hayston v. Allstate Ins. Co, 290 So. 2d 67, (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
88. 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-180 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.727(3)(b) (Supp. 1976)).
89. Lee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 339 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 330 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 332 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
90. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 330 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 332 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
91. FLA. STAT. § 768.133 (1975) (currently codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.44 (Supp. 1976)).
92. FLA. STAT. § 768.42 (Supp. 1976). This committee was created to implement an
expanded internal risk management plan (formerly codified at FLA. STAT. § 395.18 (1975), now
at FLA. STAT. § 768.41 (Supp. 1976)).
93. FLA. STAT. § 768.42(6) (Supp. 1976).
94. FLA. STAT. § 768.42(9) (Supp. 1976).
95. FLA. STAT. § 768.50 (Supp. 1976).
96. FLA. STAT. § 768.42(9)(c) (Supp. 1976).
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Under the statute liability insurance must be maintained by
the health care facility. 7 Limited liability is offered to encourage
physicians and others who provide health service to participate in
a patient's compensation fund which will assist in paying malprac-
tice claims brought against them. 8 The legal problems which may
arise from this effort to cure the malpractice crisis are beyond the
scope of this article. Presently, they involve questions of tort and
constitutional law far more than insurance law. The courts will
experience great problems in interpreting this legislation. The prob-
lem facing hospitals which are required to set up malpractice courts
may be even greater.
V. THE READABLE INSURANCE POLICY
The 1976 legislative enacted a so-called "Policyholder's Bill of
Rights." This enactment is a set of broad principles to be imple-
mented by the Department of Insurance of Florida as part of its
continuing regulation of the industry's trade practices.9 Such legis-
lation is mandated by the McCarran Act' which was passed to
forestall federal intervention in what is now clearly recognized as a
business affecting interstate commerce. All states have similar laws,
and many have had them for about thirty years.
The Florida Bill of Rights is new, however, and among its provi-
sions is one calling for a "readable policy."'' Pursuant to this provi-
sion the Department of Insurance has now set forth requirements
aimed at achieving readability.' Noteworthy provisions call for
larger type, for an index and for a distinction between captions and
text. Whether the total result will be an improvement, however,
remains doubtful. The insurance policy, the classic contract of
adhesion, is rarely read by the insured or, for that matter, by the
insurer. It is a product sold at a set price. Its meaning is not to be
found in the words that comprise it but in the decisions that inter-
pret it. Policy language changes slowly. The typical marine policy,
for instance, would be more intelligible to a seventeenth century
merchant than to a modern semanticist. Obscure as it is, much of
97. FLA STAT. § 768.42(1) (Supp. 1976).
98. FLA. STAT. § 768.54 (Supp. 1976).
99. FLA. STAT. § 626.9641 (Supp. 1976).
100. Pub. L. No. 15, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1970)).
101. FLA. STAT. § 626.9641(f) (Supp. 1976).
102. Fla. Dept. of Ins., Emergency Rule Nos. 4ER76-2, 4ER76-3, 4ER76-4.
[Vol. 31:1061
INSURANCE
the value of archaic language resides in its history. To gtart anew is
a noble effort, but it is one which may result in a flood of litigation.
Over one hundred years ago Chief Justice Doe, in discussing the
language of policy forms, said, "Seldom has the art of typography
been so successfully diverted from the-diffusion of knowledge to the
suppression of it."'
03
The Insurance Department's guidelines require that "a reason-
able policy shall not sacrifice the precision and accuracy of a legal
contract in form or appearance" but at the same time "[p]olicy
wording shall be informal . . . . Short sentences and words in com-
mon usage shall be used, whenever possible.'04 One can but wish the
draftsmen good luck, and hope that their labors are not in vain. To
quote Chief Justice Doe again,
Men have a right to be dealt with with some regard for the state
of mind and body, of knowledge and business, in which they are
known actually to exist. Whether they ought to be what they are,
or not, the fact is, that, in the present condition of society, men
in general cannot read and understand these insurance docu-
ments.10
103. DeLancey v. Insurance Co., 52 N.H. 581, 588 (1873).
104. Fla. Dept. of Ins., Emergency Rule No. 4ER76-3.
105. DeLancy v. Insurance Co., 52 N.H. 581, 590 (1873).
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